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ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PROBLEMS
RESULTING FROM SLIGHT CHANGES IN WORDING
FROM FORMER STATUTES.
Senate Bill 503, which goes into effect July 1, 1970,1 brings to
the Code of Civil Procedure sweeping changes in the law on jurisdic-
tion and service of process in California. It also leaves much of the
former law relatively unchanged. No attempt will be made to discuss
sections which make major substantive revisions or additions in the
law.2 Nor will any attempt be made to discuss sections which, despite
slight rewording, clearly do not cause any substantive change in the
effect of the law.3 This Note will focus on the slight-perhaps unno-
ticed-changes, additions or deletions in wording as introduced in
various sections of Senate Bill 503 that may or may not cause alteration
in the existing law.4
Section 410.50-Voluntary v. General
New section 410.50 governs the law concerning the acquisition
of jurisdiction and the continuance of such jurisdiction throughout sub-
sequent proceedings arising out of the original cause of action. The
court acquires jurisdiction from the time summons is served, and a
"general appearance by a party is equivalent to personal service of
summons on such party."5  Code of Civil Procedure sections 416 and
417, which will be superseded by the new provision, contain substan-
tially the same provisions concerning the acquisition and retention of
jurisdiction. However, in section 416, the appearance said to be equiv-
alent to personal service of summons is termed a "voluntary appear-
ance."
1. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 30(a), at 3375.
2. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. H8 410.10 (basis of jurisdiction), 410.30 (in-
convenient forum), 412.10 (issuance of summons), 415.20 (substitute service of sum-
mons), 415.30 (mail delivery of summons), 416.10-.90 (persons upon whom summons
may be served) (operative July 1, 1970).
3. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. H8 410.60 (jurisdiction over a defunct corpora-
tion), 410.70 (jurisdiction over joint or several debtors on contract) (operative
July 1, 1970).
4. Sections of S.B. 503 (1969) that will not be considered in this Note are: CAL.
CODE Crv. PROC. H8 410.10, 410.30, 410.60-.70, 411.10, 412.10, 413.10-.30, 415.10-.40,
416.10-.90, 417.20-.30, 467, 473.5, 1029.5 (operative July 1, 1970); CAL. Gov'T CODE
H8 69846.5, 71613.5, 72051.5 (operative July 1, 1970); CAL. CoRP. CODE § 3305.2
(operative July 1, 1970).
5. CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 410.50 (operative July 1, 1970) (emphasis added).
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In applying section 416 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Cali-
fornia courts have said that when a person "voluntarily appears gener-
ally," he will be held to have waived the objection that there has been
no personal service, and in personam jurisdiction will be acquired.6
A "voluntary appearance" has been defined in almost the same terms
as a "general appearance." The California Supreme Court has said
that a "voluntary appearance" is equivalent to personal service, and
"[w]here the defendant appears and asks some relief which can be
granted on the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction, it is a submis-
sion to the jurisdiction as completely as if he had been regularly served
with process. ' 7
Moreover, the terms "voluntary appearance" and "general appear-
ance" are often used by the courts interchangeably to characterize the
defendant's act. For example, in In re Strong's Estate8 the court
avers: "[W]here a party upon whom summons is required to be
served, voluntarily appears and makes a defense, the service of sum-
mons is waived."9  In the same discussion the court goes on to say:
"Process is waived by a general appearance, in person or by an attor-
ney, entered in the action or by some act equivalent thereto . . . or by
otherwise recognizing the authority of the court to proceed in the ac-
tion."1  Similarly, in Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court," the
court declares: "A voluntary appearance generally of a defendant is a
waiver of service of summons and of any defect therein. The filing of
6. Lacey v. Bertone, 33 Cal. 2d 649, 203 P.2d 755 (1949); Pease v. City of
San Diego, 93 Cal. App. 2d 706, 710-11, 209 P.2d 843, 845 (1949); Bayle-Lacoste &
Co. v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. App. 2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941).
"Voluntarily appears generally" should be distinguished from a special appearance.
A special appearance occurs when the party appears only to challenge jurisdiction over
his person and confines his appearance exclusively to that purpose. Judson v. Superior
Court, 21 Cal. 2d 11, 129 P.2d 361 (1942); Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 103
P. 317 (1909); Zobel v. Zobel, 151 Cal. 98, 101, 90 P. 191, 192 (1907); Pease v. City
of San Diego, 93 Cal. App. 2d 706, 209 P.2d 843 (1949). "[Ilf [the party] raises
any other question, or asks any other relief which can only be granted upon the hy-
pothesis that the court has jurisdiction over his person, then he [has] made a general
appearance." Judson v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 2d 11, 13, 129 P.2d 361, 362 (1942);
accord, Olcese v. Justice's Court, 156 Cal. 82, 87, 103 P. 317, 319 (1909); Zobel v.
Zobel, 151 Cal. 98, 101, 90 P. 191, 192 (1907); Pease v. City of San Diego, 93 Cal.
App. 2d 706, 711, 209 P.2d 843, 845 (1949). For a good discussion of special appear-
ance and acts of a party which will amount to a general appearance, see Note, Special
Appearance in California, 10 STAN. L. REV. 711 (1958).
7. In re Walden's Estate, 168 Cal. 759, 761, 145 P. 100, 101 (1914).
8. 54 Cal. App. 2d 604, 129 P.2d 493 (1942).
9. Id. at 611, 129 P.2d at 497 (emphasis added).
10. Id., quoting Harrington v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. 185, 189, 228 P. 15,
16 (1924) (emphasis added).
11. 46 Cal. App. 2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941).
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an answer is a general appearance."'12  Then in the same context the
court says: "His voluntary appearance must be deemed to be a waiver
of any failure to name him as defendant.""
Thus it can be seen that there is no distinction between voluntary
or general appearance, and the change in wording in section 410.50,
substituting "general" for "voluntary" appearance, does not result in
any substantive change in the law. One accomplishment of the modi-
fication, however, is that now the Code of Civil Procedure uniformly
defines the appearance that is sufficient to waive service of process.
Prior to its amendment, section 416 was the only statutory provision
that used the term "voluntary appearance"; consequently, with the
amendment of that section the statutory use of the term "general
appearance" will be uniform.' 4 In addition, the prior use of the term
"voluntary appearance" implied that the defendant's volition was an
important factor in determining the character of his appearance and
also whether the particular appearance was sufficient to waive service
of process. However, the character of an appearance is determined,
not by the volition or will of the defendant, but by the kind of relief
sought by the appearance.' 5 Consequently the uniform use of "general
appearance" will eliminate the ambiguity arising from the use of the
term "voluntary."
Section 411.20-Rebuttable Presumption" (affecting the
burden of producing evidence) v. "Prima Facie Evidence"
New section 411.20 is concerned with the filing of a complaint or
other first paper and the payment of filing fees. The wording of this
statute is basically the same as that of old section 405.5 of the Code
of Civil Procedure. Both sections provide that if all the necessary filing
fees have not been paid, the clerk shall mail a notification of the unpaid
fees to the party filing the paper and execute a certificate of such mailing.
However, the effect to be given the clerk's certificate is worded differ-
entiy in the two statutes. Under old section 405.5 the clerk's certifi-
cate is treated as "prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein."'u
12. Id. at 644, 116 P.2d at 463 (emphasis added).
13. Id. (emphasis added). In addition, Homey v. Superior Court, 83 Cal. App.
2d 262, 188 P.2d 552 (1948), held that "a voluntary appearance for any purpose other
than to question the jurisdiction of the court is general." Id. at 271, 188 P.2d at 557.
14. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 418.10, 581a (operative July 1, 1970); Cal.
Stat. 1963, ch. 878, § 1, at 2125, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 416.1 (effective until July 1,
1970); Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1452, § 5, at 2640, CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 581a (effective
until July 1, 1970).
15. See note 6 supra.
16. Emphasis added.
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On the other hand, the clerk's certificate under new section 411.20 is
said to establish "a rebuttable presumption that such fees were not
paid.' 17
This change of statutory language, which may seem to be a sig-
nificant modification of the law, is superficial, and results in no sub-
stantive alteration. Reference need only be made to the California Evi-
dence Code, which specifies that "a statute providing that a fact or
group of facts is prima facie evidence of another fact establishes a re-
buttable presumption."' 8
"Every rebuttable presumption is either (a) a presumption affect-
ing the burden of producing evidence or (b) a presumption affecting
the burden of proof."' 9  There is no doubt that the rebuttable pre-
sumption created in new section 411.20 affects the burden of producing
evidence because the statute itself declares it to be such a presump-
tion.20
Whether the prima facie evidence-rebuttable presumption created
under the old section is one affecting the burden of proof or burden
of producing evidence is uncertain, since the statute itself does not
classify it, nor does any California decision interpret the statute.2' Ap-
parently, this former section only created a rebuttable presumption af-
fecting the burden of producing evidence, since the legislature mani-
fested no intent to change the effect of the amended statute.
Furthermore, the subject matter of the statute does not involve a
situation that calls for the application of a presumption affecting the
burden of proof. A presumption affecting the burden of proof is de-
signed to implement some public policy beyond the facilitation of
the particular action in which it is applied.22 For example, such a
presumption is applied in cases where the legitimacy of a marriage or a
birth is called into question,23 and it must be rebutted by the defendant
by a preponderance of the evidence.24
A rebuttable presumption affecting the burden of producing evi-
dence, on the other hand, is only an expression of experience, designed
to dispense with unnecessary facts that are likely to be true if not dis-
17. Emphasis added.
18. CAL. Evm. CODE § 602.
19. Id. § 601.
20. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 411.20 (operative July 1, 1970).
21. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 602, Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
22. Id. § 605.
23. Id.
24. Id. § 115.
[Vol. 21
puted, 2 5 and merely evidence sufficient to support the nonexistence of
the fact need be introduced for the presumption to be rebutted.2 6 The
effect to be given the clerk's certificate under old section 405.5
squarely fits this latter category and it is certain that the legislature, by
creating the prima facie evidence-rebuttable presumption in the old
statute, intended."to implement no public policy other than to facilitate
the determination of the particular action .... ,27
Since there is no change in the law, the most probable explanation
for the change in wording from "prima facie evidence" to a "rebut-
table presumption" affecting the burden of producing evidence is that
it was intended to clarify the ambiguity which existed under the former
section and to avoid the necessity of judicial interpretation of the phrase
"prima facie evidence."2
Section 414.10-"Of the County Where the Defendant is Found"
Old Code of Civil Procedure section 410 provides: "The sum-
mons may be served by the sheriff, a constable, or marshal, of the
county where the defendant is found, or any other person over the age
of 18, not a party to the action." Hence, under the law until July 1,
1970, any person not a party to the action and over 18 years of age can
serve summons anywhere in California, except that a sheriff, constable,
or marshal can serve summons only within his own county.29
New Section 414.10 will replace the portion of old section 410
that deals with the individuals who may serve summons and provides
that "[a] summons may be served by any person who is at least 18
years of age and not a party to the action." The earlier provision deal-
ing with the sheriff, constable, or marshal, has been omitted from the
new section. 0 Thus a law enforcement officer is apparently placed on
the same level as an ordinary individual for purposes of service of
process, and since the individual is not confined to a specific service
25. See id. § 603, Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
26. See id. § 604.
27. CAL. EviD. CODE § 603. Compare id. §§ 603, 604 (presumptions affecting
the burden of producing evidence) with id. §§ 605, 606 (presumptions affecting the
burden of proof).
28. For a discussion of problems and interpretations of presumptions and prima
facie evidence, see Comment, The California Evidence Code: Presumptions, 53 CALIM.
L. REv. 1439 (1965).
29. See note 34 & text accompanying notes 34-36 infra.
30. Compare Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1324, § 3, at 3150, CAL. CoDE Civ. PRoc. § 410
(effective until July 1, 1970) with CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 414.10 (operative July 1,
1970).
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range it would seem to follow that a law enforcement officer is not so
confined either.
This argument falters in respect to constables and marshals. One
of the functions of a marshal is to attend the municipal court of the
district in which he is appointed or elected to act.3 1 A constable has
the identical duty in respect to the justice courts of his district.2 Both
are authorized to execute, serve, and return all writs and process deliv-
ered to them by their respective courts, but each, when serving such
paper or otherwise acting as attendant of his court, is restricted by stat-
ute in the performance of those duties to the county of his judicial
district.3 3
There are no California cases interpreting the provision in section
410 that confines the sheriff to a particular county for service of process
purposes.34  However, the California rule on statutory interpretation
and construction provides that except where clearly intended or indi-
cated, words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and
receive a sensible construction in accord with their commonly under-
stood meaning.35 Utilizing this precept, it is evident that under the
old law, a summons cannot be served by either a sheriff, constable or
marshal from a county other than the one where the defendant is
found. 6
Although the statutory restriction still remains for a constable and
marshal despite section 414.10,17 the new law contains no similar limi-
tation on the power of the sheriff to serve summons. The sheriff is
authorized by statute to "serve all process and notices in the manner
provided by law,""8 and there is no express restriction of the power
31. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 71264.
32. Id. §§ 27820, 71264.
33. Id.; 49 OPS. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 130 (1967).
34. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410 was originally enacted in 1872. Prior to
this, Hahn v. Kelly, 34 Cal. 391 (1868), held that jurisdiction may be obtained by
personal service of summons by the sheriff of the county where the defendant is
found.
35. Pasadena Univ. v. Los Angeles County, 190 Cal. 786, 214 P. 868 (1923);
People ex rel. Hamilton v. City of Santa Barbara, 205 Cal. App. 2d 501, 23 Cal.
Rptr. 240 (1962); People v. Kimbley, 189 Cal. App. 2d 300, 11 Cal. Rptr. 519
(1961).
36. See Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1324, § 3, at 3150, CAL. CODE CIr. PROC. § 410
(effective until July 1, 1970).
37. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 27820, 71264.
38. Id. § 26608. In Hibernia Say. & Loan Soc'y v. Clarke, 110 Cal. 27, 42 P.
425 (1895), "all" was construed to mean only such process as comes into sheriff's
hands and does not exclude any other person from serving process where authorized
by statute.
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of the sheriff to be found in the sections authorizing him to serve sum-
mons. 9 Consequently, by the substitution of section 414.10 for sec-
tion 410 of the Code of Civil Procedure, it appears that a sheriff of any
particular county now might effectively serve summons upon a defend-
ant regardless of where in the state the defendant is found.40
The propriety of permitting statewide service by a sheriff is dubi-
ous. The most logical explanation for the unequal treatment of law
enforcement officers under section 414.10 is that the legislature failed
to realize that the California Government Code does not place a county-
wide service limitation on sheriffs. The manifested change is prob-
ably unintentional since there is no reason to place a sheriff in a special
class and allow him to serve process statewide while restricting other
law enforcement officers. Presumably, it would take more than this
questionable change in the service statute to alter a California practice
that has existed for more than a hundred years.41
Section 415.50-Statutory Wording Changes in the
Service by Publication Statute
New section 415.50 contains the rules dealing with service of proc-
ess by publication. Basically, this section is identical in scope to the
sections it will supersede, 42 but several changes in wording in the new
section raise the question whether the legal effect of the new and super-
seded sections are the same.
"Party" v. "Person" and "Corporation"
In stating the applicability of service by publication, new section
415.50 terms the one to receive such service "the party." Old section
412, dealing with the same subject matter, denotes the defendant to be
served as a "person, corporation or unincorporated association." The
older statute thus identifies more explicitly the person or organization
on whom service by publication may be made.
The use of the word "party" in new section 415.50 makes no
change in the law but only helps make it more concise and clear by
eliminating unnecessary wording. The use of the words "corporation"
and "unincorporated association" after "person" in the old statute is
39. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 26608, 26665.
40. See id. § 26665.
41. See note 34 supra.
42. Cal. Stat. 1968, ch. 132, § 3, at 712, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 412 (effective
until July 1, 1970).
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redundant, for these former two terms have been included under the
definition California has given the term "person."4
"Reasonable" v. "Due" Diligence
Before a summons may be served by publication pursuant to new
section 415.50, it must appear to the satisfaction of the court in which
the action is pending that the "party to be served cannot with reason-
able diligence be served"44 in any other manner provided by law. The
old section has a similar requirement that "due diligence" must be
used to personally serve the defendant before resort may be made to
service by publication. From an examination of the statutes them-
selves and the acts required of a party before he may serve by publica-
tion,45 it is obvious that the legislature intended no change in the exist-
ing law by this change in wording. 6
"Due" is defined in the dictionary as "requisite or appropriate in
accordance with accepted notions of what is right, reasonable, fitting
or necessary."4  "Reasonable" means "being or remaining within the
bounds of reason: not extreme: not excessive."48 Thus, even the lay
definitions show that no material difference exists between the two ad-
jectives, one even being defined in terms of the other.
In any event, the modifiers in this case are not the important
words. The controlling word is "diligence,' 49 and this remains un-
changed in section 415.50. "Diligence" is a relative term and must
be determined as a matter of fact from the affidavits in each particular
case.
50
43. Douglas v. Pacific Mail S.S. Co., 4 Cal. 304 (1854); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC.
§ 17; CAL. EviD. CODE § 175; CAL. GOV'T CODE § 17.
44. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.50(a) (operative July 1, 1970) (emphasis
added).
45. E.g., Vorburg v. Vorburg, 18 Cal. 2d 794, 117 P.2d 875 (1941); Roberts v.
Jacob, 154 Cal. 307, 97 P. 671 (1908), afI'd, 223 U.S. 261 (1912); Rue v. Quinn, 137
Cal. 651, 66 P. 216 (1901); Narum v. Cheatham, 127 Cal. App. 505, 15 P.2d 1106
(1932).
46. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.50, Judicial Council Comment (operative July 1,
1970). The comment to this section also contains a discussion of the meaning of
reasonable diligence with citations to cases construing the term.
47. WEBsTE's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 699 (P. Grove ed. 1968)
(emphasis added).
48. Id. at 1892.
49. Vorburg v. Vorburg, 18 Cal. 2d 794, 117 P.2d 875 (1941) (diligence used
without any adjective).
50. See id.
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"Published Within the State"
Under new section 415.50(b), the court is to order publication of
the summons in a named newspaper that is published in California
and also is most likely to give actual notice to the party to be served.
Under the old section,5 ' there is no explicit requirement that the news-
paper be published within California.52 However, the publication of no-
tice, whether under the old or new law, has to be made in a newspaper
of general circulation.58
A newspaper of general circulation is defined by statute in part as
one "published at regular intervals in the state, county, or city where
the publication [or] notice by publication. . . is to be given or made
. . ..~ ,A fortiori, the publication of summons has always had to be
in a named newspaper published in the state, and so the new wording
merely codifies existing law.
"Address" v. "Residence"
The final change in wording that the new law makes in the publi-
cation statute is in the substitution of "address" for "residence." Under
the new law, if the "address" of the party to be served by publication is
ascertained before expiration of the time prescribed for publication of
summons, a copy of the summons and of the complaint is to be mailed
to the party's "address" 55 rather than to his "residence", as the old stat-
ute requires.56 However, California courts have held that there is no
difference between "address" and "residence" for the purposes of the
publication statute,5" and consequently this change in statutory wording
also has no substantive effect.
51. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 413 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
52. See id.
53. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6060 states: "Whenever any law provides that publica-
tion shall be made in a designated section of this article, such notice shall be published
in a newspaper of general circulation. .. ." Both CAL. CODE Civ. PROc. § 415.50(b)
(operative July 1, 1970) and Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL. CODE CrV.
PROC. § 413 (effective until July 1, 1970) provide that notice should be published for
the time specified by section 6064 of the Government Code-a designated section of
the above article.
54. CA. GOV'T CODE § 6000 (emphasis added).
55. CAL. CODE Civ. Pnoc. § 415.50(b) (operative July 1, 1970).
56. Cal. Stat. 1957, ch. 1669, § 1, at 3048, CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 413 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
57. San Diego Sav. Bank v. Goodsell, 137 Cal. 420, 70 P. 299 (1902); cf. Ridge
v. Boulder Creek School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 2d 453, 140 P.2d 990 (1943), construing
Cal. Stat. 1937, ch. 149, § 1, at 414.
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Section 417.10-Statutory Wording Changes
in the Proof of Service Statute.
Construction of Section 417.10(a)
New section 417.10 governs proof that process has been served
upon a person within the state. According to section 417.10(a), if the
process is served personally on the defendant by hand,58 proof of such
service is made by the affidavit of the person making the service.
The new section goes into great detail in specifying what the affi-
davit must contain: It must show the time, place, manner of serv-
ice, 9 facts showing that service has been properly made, the name of
the person who received a copy of the summons and the complaint, and
if appropriate, the title or capacity in which the person is served."° If
the process is served on a corporation or unincorporated association,
the affidavit must also state that the proper notice requirements ap-
peared on the copy of the summons served.6 ' These statutory details
as to the contents of the affidavit are new to the law; the only informa-
tion required to be in the affidavit under the old law is a statement of
the time and place of service. 6 2
Again, as in the case of persons who may serve summons, the
sheriff, constable and marshal are not mentioned in the new section
as they are in the old. 63 However, since a sheriff, constable or marshal
is authorized to make service64 and to certify that such service was
made,6 5 his certificate of service may be used in lieu of the affidavit.66
58. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415.10 (operative July 1, 1970). CAL. CODE Civ.
PROC. § 417.10(a) (operative July 1, 1970) also includes proof of service by mail and
by substituted service pursuant to CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 415.20, 415.30 (operative
July 1, 1970). However, since service of process by mail or substituted service of
process were unknown in the former law, a discussion of these sections is beyond the
scope of this Note.
59. The manner of service must be shown because there are other methods of
service than by mere personal delivery. See note 58 supra.
60. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417.10(a) (operative July 1, 1970).
61. Id. Compare CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 412.30 (operative July 1, 1970) with
Cal. Stat. 1967, ch. 1324, § 3, at 3150, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 410 (effective until
July 1, 1970).
62. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 21, at 1847, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
63. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417.10(a) (operative July 1, 1970) with
Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 21, at 1847, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 415(1) (effective
until July 1, 1970). See the discussion of the omission of sheriff, constable and marshal
as persons who may serve summons in notes 35-41 & accompanying text supra.
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 26608 (sheriffs), 27820, 71264 (constables and mar-
shals).
65. Id. § 26609 (sheriffs), 71265 (constables and marshals); see Price v.
Hibbs, 225 Cal. App. 2d 209, 37 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1964).
66. Harris v. Minnesota Inv. Co., 89 Cal. App. 396, 265 P. 306 (1928).
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The most important problem of new section 417.10(a) stems
from the fact that it deals solely with the affidavit as proof of service.
Because of this emphasis, the section implies that the affidavit itself is
sufficient proof of service to support a default judgment. Old section
410, however, states that when process is served the summons must be
returned along with the affidavit or certificate of service.
Although "return" is not used in new section 417.10, the term
appears in old section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure and remains
unchanged by the amendmentY7  Section 581a has been interpreted to
mean that an action "must be dismissed unless the summons is served
and filed with the clerk of the court together with the officer's certifi-
cate of service, if it was served by an officer, or the affidavit of the per-
son who served it, if it was served by any other person ..... Il As
used in section 581a, "'return thereon made' [means] the filing of the
summons in the office of the clerk together with a statement of what
was done in connection with the service thereof." 69
The courts have been lenient with defective affidavits, if service is
shown to have been actually made.76 There need be no separate filing
of the affidavit; the filing of the original summons with the affidavit
attached or annexed to it is sufficient to support a default judgment.7'1
But the mere making of the affidavit or certificate without filing the
original summons is insufficient for a return.7 2 Hence, the implication
that arises from the emphasis on the affidavit of service in new section
417.10(a)-that the affidavit is sufficient proof of service in and of
itself to support a default judgment-is clearly misleading. Care must
be taken to read this section in light of how the term "return" is used
in section 581a, as amended,'7 3 and how it has been interpreted by the
cases.
67. For a discussion of wording changes in the amendment of section 581a by
S.B. 503 (1969), see notes 88-98 & accompanying text infra.
68. Frohman v. Bonelli, 91 Cal. App. 2d 285, 291, 204 P.2d 890, 893 (1949)
(emphasis added).
69. Id. at 288, 204 P.2d at 892.
70. E.g., Cardwell v. Sabichi, 59 Cal. 490 (1881) (default judgment upheld
where certificate showed time, place, and manner of service, although it did not men-
tion the name of defendant); Wheat v. McNeill, 111 Cal. App. 72, 295 P. 102 (1931)
(default judgment upheld where affidavit showed fact of service but was erroneous as
to place of service).
71. Hibernia Say. & Loan Soe'y v. Clarke, 110 Cal. 27, 42 P. 425 (1895).
72. Frohman v. BoneUi, 91 Cal. App. 2d 285, 204 P.2d 890 (1949).
73. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 24, at 3373, amending CAL. CODB Civ. PRoC.
§ 581a (operative July 1, 1970).
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"Publisher"
The law governing proof of service by publication is set out in
new section 417.10(b). In addition to stating exactly what must be
in the affidavit and removing any ambiguity that may have existed on
this point in the old law, section 417.10(b) adds the "publisher" to
the group of persons, including the printer, his foreman or the principal
clerk, who may make the affidavit. However, the addition of a "pub-
lisher" to those who may make the affidavit, although a change in the
wording of the statute,"4 is not a substantive change in the law, for
even under the old statute, 75 a publisher is allowed to make the affi-
davit since he is presumed to be the printer.70
Section 418.10--"Cross-Defendant"
New section 418.10 does not change the old law dealing with mo-
tions to quash service of summons.77  The new section provides: "A
defendant . . .may serve and file a notice of motion (1) to quash
service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court
over him."'78  There is a conspicuous omission in this section, for the
old law applies the provisions to both "defendants and cross-defend-
ants."71 9  The intention of the legislature, however, is that the new stat-
ute continue to encompass both defendants and cross-defendants. s0
One California statute that attempts to explain the term "cross-de-
fendant" states that " '[d]efendant' includes a person in the position of
a defendant in a cross-action or counterclaim.""' A cross-action may
arise whenever a defendant seeks affirmative relief against any party
that relates to the transaction upon which the original cause of action
74. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417.10(b) (operative July 1, 1970) with
Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 21, at 1847, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415(3) (effective until
July 1, 1970).
75. Cal. Stat. 1933, ch. 744, § 21, at 1847, CAT. CODE CIV. PROC. § 415(3)
(effective until July 1, 1970).
76. People v. Thomas, 101 Cal. 571, 36 P. 9 (1894).
77. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 878, § 1, at 2125, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 416.1 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1452, §§ 2-3, at 2639-40, CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. §§ 416.2-.3 (effective until July 1, 1970).
78. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 418.10(a)(1) (operative July 1, 1970).
79. Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 878, § 1, at 2125, CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 416.1 (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970); Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1452, §§ 2-3, at 2639-40, CAL. CODE
CIV. PROC. §§ 416.2-.3 (effective until July 1, 1970). Compare id., with CAL. CODE
CrV. PROC. § 418.10 (operative July 1, 1970).
80. See CAL. CODE Cxv. PROC. § 418.10, Judicial Council Comment (opera-
tive July 1, 1970).
81. CAL. COMM. CODE § 1201(13), Law Revision Comm'n Comment.
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is based. 2 The affirmative relief takes the form of a cross-complaint,
which must be served upon the party or parties affected.83 "If any of
the parties affected by the cross-complaint have not appeared in the
action, a summons upon the cross-complaint must be issued upon them
in the same manner as upon the commencement of an original action. '8 4
If no summons is issued on parties affected by a cross-complaint, the
court has no jurisdiction to determine the rights asserted in the cross-
complaint seeking affirmative relief.85 Thus, a party or parties af-
fected by a cross-complaint are to be treated the same as an ordinary
defendant for purposes of service of summons.
It is obvious that the party adverse to the one asserting the cross-
complaint is the cross-defendant.8 6 Therefore, it appears that the omis-
sion of the term "cross-defendant" from section 418.10 is not significant,
and that a cross-defendant is included within the term "defendant."
Section 581a--"Must!' v. "Shall"
Section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure has also been
amended by Senate Bill 503. This section contains the basic provisions
for dismissal of actions for want of prosecution because of failure to
serve summons. The old statute provides that all actions "must" be
dismissed by the court in which it was commenced unless summons has
been served within one year and return thereon made within three years
after the commencement of the action. 8  It also provides that all ac-
tions "must' be dismissed by the court if summons has been served, but
no answer has been filed, and the plaintiff fails to secure a judgment
within three years.8"
The ostensible purpose of the amendment of section 581a was to
delete the one year limitation on issuance of summons. 90 This pur-
pose is accomplished, and the new statute otherwise reads exactly the
same as the old one, except for the substitution of "shall" in the new
provision in both of the places where "must" appears in the old sec-
82. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 442.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Bank of America v. Carr, 138 Cal. App. 2d 727, 292 P.2d 587 (1956).
86. See CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 308.
87. See notes 67-73 & accompanying text supra, for a further discussion of the
significance of section 581a.
88. Cal. Stat. 1955, ch. 1452, § 5, at 2640, CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 581a (ef-
fective until July 1, 1970).
89. Id.
90. CAL. CODE CIV. Paoc. § 581a, Judicial Council Comment (operative July 1,
1970).
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tion. 91 This change raises the question whether, by the use of the word
"shall" instead of "must,' 9 2 it is now within a court's discretion to dis-
miss an action falling within the purview of section 581 a.
The California courts have been rigid in their interpretation of sec-
tion 581a, holding that its provisions call for mandatory dismissal.13
But the cases giving this interpretation were decided under section 58 la
when it contained the term "must," and some of the decisions have
emphasized the use of this word in the statute to reach their conclu-
sions. 94
The solution to the problem is found in the original California
statute concerned with dismissal for want of prosecution. 5 This stat-
ute, like the new amendment to 581a, also used "shall" rather than
"must."96  In construing this original statute, the California Supreme
Court held that the section was prohibitory and mandatory saying:
"To hold this statute directory would be . . . to repeal it." 97  "Must"
was substituted for "shall" when this original statute was first amended
to become section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure.98  Thus, since
it has already been held that the similar use of the word "shall" in the
original California statute imported compulsory dismissal, there is no
reason for this word to have any other meaning under Senate Bill 503.
Section 1032b-Omission of "Subpoena"
The legislature, by repealing section 410.1 of the Code of Civil
91. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 581a (operative July 1, 1970) with Cal.
Stat. 1955, ch. 1452, § 5, at 2640, CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 581a (effective until
July 1, 1970).
92. New code section 412.20 also substitutes "shall" for "must," which was used
in old section 407. However, the legislative intent is clear, and according to the com-
ment of the Judicial Council following section 412.20, the new provision remains man-
datory.
93. E.g., Gonsalves v. Bank of America, 16 Cal. 2d 169, 172, 105 P.2d 118, 120
(1940); Modoc Land & Livestock Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. 255, 256-57, 60 P.
848, 849 (1900); Thompson & Sons v. Superior Court, 215 Cal. App. 2d 719, 720, 30
Cal. Rptr. 471, 472 (1963); Beckwith v. County of Los Angeles, 132 Cal. App. 2d 377,
378-79, 282 P.2d 87, 88 (1955); Frohman v. Bonelli, 91 Cal. App. 2d 285, 287, 204
P.2d 890, 891 (1949); Rio Del Mar Country Club v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. App. 2d
214, 220, 190 P.2d 295, 299 (1948).
94. Palmer v. Superior Court, 192 Cal. App. 2d 302, 303, 13 Cal. Rptr. 301, 302
(1961); Muller v. Coastside County Water Dist., 180 Cal. App. 2d 712, 713, 4 Cal.
Rptr. 832, 833 (1960).
95. Cal. Stat. 1889, ch. 259, § 581(7), at 398.
96. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 581a (operative July 1, 1970) with Cal.
Stat. 1889, ch. 259, § 581(7), at 398.
97. Vrooman v. Li Po Tai, 113 Cal. 302, 305, 45 P. 470, 471 (1896).
98. Cal. Stat. 1907, ch. 376, § 581a, at 712.
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Procedure9 and substituting section 1032b therefor, appears to have
made an unfortunate omission. Both sections deal with the cost of
service of summons when served by someone other than a public officer
or employee of the state. Whereas old section 410.1 provides that one
serving either a summons or subpoena can recover no more than the
statutory amount stipulated for a public officer, 100 section 1032b only
retains a similar provision as to one who serves a summons but fails to
cover the cost of serving a subpoena. 10
As the definition of summons' 0 2 is different from that of a sub-
poena, 03 the latter should not be included in the word "summons" for
the purposes of this section. Thus, the legislature by omission of the
word "subpoena" in section 1032b, seems to have inadvertently failed
to provide a statutory maximum cost recoverable for service of a sub-
poena by someone other than a public officer, and has left strictly to
court's discretion the determination of cost when the problem arises.
An obvious answer to the problem would be for the legislature to
amend the section and substitute "process" for "summons." By doing
this, both summons and subpoena would be covered by the statute since
"process" includes both. 04
Conclusion
This Note has been confined to analyzing statutory construction
problems arising from slight changes, inclusions, and omissions of
wording in Senate Bill 503. There was no apparent legislative intent
to change the old law by the changes in wording which have been dis-
cussed, and the new wording has, by and large, left the former law unaf-
fected.
The predominant effect of the changes, inclusions and omissions
of wording is to streamline statutory language, aiding the conciseness
and clarity of the amended sections. The legislative aim of eliminating
ambiguity through succinctness is achieved in most but not all of the
sections discussed.
Section 417.10, for example, by superseding section 410, fails to
99. Cal. Stat. 1969, ch. 1610, § 11, at 3372.
100. Fees recoverable by a public officer are governed by CAL. Gov'T CODE
§§ 26721 (summons), 26743 (subpoena), 26746 (mileage).
101. Compare CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1032b (operative July 1, 1970) with Cal.
Stat. 1953, ch. 52, § 1, at 696, CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 410.1 (effective until July 1,
1970).
102. CAL. CODE Civ. PROC. § 412.20 (operative July 1, 1970).
103. CAL. CODE Crv. PROC. § 1885.
104. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 22.
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state, as the earlier section does, that both the affidavit of service and the
summons must be returned. Because of the sole focus on the affidavit,
an incorrect implication arises that the affidavit of service is itself a
sufficient return which could support a default judgment. Section
417.10 must be read with section 581a to make clear that an affidavit
must be accompanied by the original summons and complaint before
there can be an effective return.10 5 Further ambiguity is caused by the
omission of sheriff, constable and marshall in new section 414.10.
While a constable and marshal are still restricted by other statutes, the
effect of the new section appears to segregate a sheriff into a special
class allowing him a statewide service range on a par with a private
individual. 10 Finally, the legislature, by only providing for summons
and omitting "subpoena" from section 1032b, has failed to provide a
maximum cost recoverable for service of a subpoena by one other than
a statutory officer. 107
These latter two omissions produce uncertainty about whether or
not the legislature actually intended a substantive change in the law.
The most probable explanation for the omissions and the resulting am-
biguity is oversight on the part of the legislature-oversight that can
only be remedied by legislative amendment or by judicial construction
of the statutes involved.
Mark A. Klein*
105. See discussion of the problem of a "return" in notes 67-73 & accompanying
text supra.
106. See discussion of omission of sheriff, constable and marshal by section 414.10
in notes 29-41 & accompanying text supra.
107. See discussion of omission of "subpoena" by section 1032b in notes 99-103 &
accompanying text supra.
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